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Abstract 
New mechanistic philosophy has not examined explanations in ecology although they are 
based extensively on describing mechanisms responsible for phenomena under scrutiny. 
This chapter uses the example of research on the shrub Lonicera maackii (Amur 
honeysuckle) to scrutinize individual-level mechanisms that are generally accepted and 
used in ecology and confronts them with the minimal account of mechanisms. Individual-
level mechanisms are for a phenomenon, are hierarchical, and absent entities play a role 
in their functioning. They are distinguished by the role played by properties in 
determining activities and organization. The chapter also considers the experimental 
methods for discovery of individual-level mechanisms, the possibility of group-level 
mechanisms in ecology, and suggests further research problems.  
 
I. Introduction 
Genetics, cell biology and molecular biology offered to philosophers of science sufficient 
examples to challenge the logical empiricist view on scientific inquiry as a search for 
laws of nature and scientific explanation as subsumption of phenomena under laws. 
Those areas of biology indicated instead that scientific inquiry is a search for mechanisms 
and explanation is a matter of describing them (see Chapters 1 and 24). The resulting new 
mechanistic philosophy of science offered various accounts of mechanisms whose 
common assumptions are articulated by this formulation of a minimal mechanism: 
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A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities (or parts) whose activities and 
interactions are organized so as to be responsible for the phenomenon (see 
Chapter 1).  
Mechanisms are real and local complex systems or processes that are responsible for the 
phenomena scientists study. Mechanisms produce phenomena in virtue of their parts that 
are organized and engage in activities or interact. For example, a heart is a mechanism for 
pumping blood. It produces this phenomenon due to its parts right and left ventricles, 
right and left aortas, and the valves. They perform activities, such as the right ventricle 
contracting and pushing the blood into the pulmonary trunk, while the valves open and 
close. Parts and activities are organized. Blood is collected in the right atrium first, but 
not in the left atrium, and the tricuspid valve opens toward the apex of the heart, but not 
toward its top. Mechanistic approach is reductionist in that it explains properties and 
activities of the whole in terms of properties and activities of its lower-level parts. That 
walls of the heart contract is explained by referring to three layers of cardiac muscles and 
to the intercalated disks that enable direct transmission of electrical impulses between 
cells, which also shows that mechanisms are hierarchical. The mechanistic approach 
acknowledges the complexity of real systems and examines mechanisms in their contexts. 
Accordingly, operation of the heart mechanism is considered in the context of the thorax, 
its interaction with the diaphragm, the lungs and the system of blood vessels.  
Mechanistic philosophers of biology have not examined mechanisms in ecology, 
which is important to do since they are ubiquitous, as a simple search of ecology 
publications can reveal, ecology is part of biology, and ecological mechanisms might be 
different from the rest. I use the case of the invasive shrub Lonicera maackii (Amur 
honeysuckle) to examine mechanisms at the level of individuals. I explore then the case 
of mechanisms involving groups of organisms. First, a brief on what is ecology. 
 
II. What is Ecology? 
Ecology is not environmentalism and its focus is not environmental problems and the 
effects of human impact on the environment. Ecology is a discipline of biology that 
studies the world of plants and animals, including humans, and is widely understood as 
“the scientific study of the interactions that define the distribution and abundance of 
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organisms” (Krebs 2008, 5). Distribution is the place in nature where organisms are 
found, while abundance is their number in an area. Distribution and abundance are two 
facets of the same phenomenon and the factors that affect the former could also influence 
the latter. The factors that determine the distribution and abundance of organisms fall into 
two categories: biotic and abiotic. Biotic factors comprise interactions between 
organisms, such as predation, or competition. Abiotic factors comprise influences of the 
environment on organisms, such as temperature, availability of light or water, its pH, or 
the nature of the ground. 
Distribution and abundance are examined at various levels of increasing 
complexity and integration, but of decreasing understanding: populations, communities, 
ecosystems, landscapes, and biosphere. To explain phenomena of distribution and 
abundance at one level, ecologists typically seek explanatory mechanisms at lower levels. 
For example, behavioral and physiological mechanisms operating at the individual level 
are sought to explain changes in a population. Because its area of investigation spans so 
many levels, ecology neighbors with multiple sciences. It draws on physiological and 
behavioral studies of individual organisms, as well as on meteorology, geology, and 
geochemistry for its explanations (Krebs 2008). Ernest Haeckel introduced the term 
ecology in 1869, but ecological research and interest predate this date, making it one of 
the oldest disciplines of biology.  
 
III. An Example of Individual-Level Ecological Mechanisms  
Research on the competitive success of the invasive shrub Lonicera maackii (Amur 
honeysuckle)2 against native plants illustrates how ecologists examine and conceive of 
mechanisms at the individual level and their effects at macro scale. 
Specimens of the shrub were introduced to the U.S. in 1898 to the New York 
Botanical Garden. From there, humans further dispersed shrub specimens to serve as 
ornament or to stabilize soil. Furthermore, birds, deer, and small mammals consume the 
seeds of the shrub and drop them with feces at various locations, which helped the 
invasive plant establish throughout vast areas of the midwestern U.S.  
L. maackii dominates native plants in competition for light and suppresses their 
growth because it has a dense canopy, is able to produce numerous stem shoots and grow 
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rapidly in habitats with different light regimens. When grown in understory, L. maackii 
maximizes height gain and allocates energy to continuous production of basal long shoots 
and consequently has a lower canopy width, fewer shoot ends, and a smaller diameter of 
basal stems. Should more light become available, which happens when a patch of forest 
is cleared, say, by a fallen tree, the shrub stops producing basal long shoots and starts 
producing long shoots at higher levels in the canopy, develops wider canopies, and 
produces more leaves. Compared to indigenous shrub species, L. maackii is able to equal 
or exceed the maximum stem growth, higher stomatal density and thickness of leaves, 
higher leaf number, area, and mass in low-light conditions, but exceeds such a 
performance in high-light conditions that occur following disturbances in forests. Under 
both light conditions, L. maackii allocates more energy to branch and leaf mass growth 
and this allows it to overgrow the slow-growing native shrubs. The shrub is fully able to 
regenerate after the first clipping both in open-growth and in forested areas. It leafs two 
to three weeks before the native plants and drops the leaves four-to-six weeks later than 
the native plants, and can be observed as late as December. Its leaves are also freeze-
resistant and are not damaged by spring bouts of cold, in contrast to the native species. 
Seedlings establish throughout a variety of light conditions, and even those that were 
suppressed due to clumped seed input can survive and replace adult shrubs. All these 
features endow the plant with a dense canopy that decreases light availability to the 
ground, suppressing the growth of other plants.  
In addition to outcompeting native plants for light, L. maackii dominates below-
ground competition for nutrients and water. Its roots cover a wider area close to the 
surface, which allows it to deprive neighboring plants of water and nutrients, suppressing 
their growth. Additionally, it suppresses the growth of native plants by means of 
chemicals in a process called allelopathy. Leaves produce thirteen mildly acidic toxic 
compounds that inhibit or delay germination of seeds, or alter size, survival, and 
architecture (number of branches and bolts) of native plants and deter generalist 
herbivores from consuming its leaves. Roots produce similar chemicals, but they have 
milder inhibiting effects on neighboring plants. Chemicals released into the ground from 
decomposing leaves and by roots modify soil and leaf microbial communities, altering 
ecosystem function and processes. 
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Ecologists research above and below ground competition, as well as allelopathy 
as separate mechanisms, yet none of them is solely responsible for the competitive 
success of L. maackii. Since they act jointly, I suggest representing the separate 
descriptions in an integrated account (Figure 32.1), which will also facilitate the 
forthcoming philosophical examination of these mechanisms. 
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Figure 32.1 Integrated representation of the mechanisms of competitive success of L. 
maackii. Dispersal mechanisms at the large scale consist of activities of humans and 
animals transporting specimens and seeds of L. maackii at large distances. At the local 
scale, the mechanisms responsible for the competitive success of L. maackii and the 
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elimination of native flora are causation by absence of herbivores and of better 
competitors, the mechanisms of above ground competition for light, of below ground 
competition of nutrients, of allelopathy via leaf and root exudates, and of tolerance and 
resistance to herbivory. Drawing by the author. 
 
 
IV. Individual-Level Mechanisms in Philosophical Focus 
Ecological Mechanisms and the Minimal Account. Individual-level ecological 
mechanisms satisfy most, but not all features of the minimal account of mechanisms and 
their particularities contribute toward the general examination of mechanisms.  
Several decades after the introduction of L. maackii to the U.S., it became clear 
that it is not an innocent shrub that beautifies landscapes, but a shrub that efficiently 
suppresses and eliminates native plants. This phenomenon of suppression and elimination 
of native flora required explanation that ecologists formulated from the beginning not in 
terms of laws, ecological or otherwise, but in terms of mechanisms. And so they 
articulated the mechanism of competition for light, of belowground competition for water 
and nutrients, and the mechanism of allelopathy, which were meant to account entirely 
for the elimination of native flora or offer partial explanations of that phenomenon. 
Accordingly, ecological mechanisms, just like in other areas of biology, are mechanisms 
for a phenomenon and are formulated to explain it.  
Ecologists often characterize individual-level mechanisms as consisting of 
individual organisms with certain properties doing certain activities. In Gause’s (1934) 
account of the mechanism of competition, the components are the individual cells of 
yeast differentiated by the property tolerance to alcohol. Alcohol produced by S. kephir is 
more toxic to S. cerevisiae than vice versa, the latter being eliminated. L. maackii is 
representative of cases in which the phenomenon cannot be explained by reference to a 
property of the individual organism and its activity, but to several properties and 
activities that engage different parts of the same organism. Accordingly, it is parts of 
organism that are entities in various mechanisms. The roots of L. maackii are components 
of the mechanism for below-ground competition, while its shoots and leaves are parts of 
the mechanism for above-ground competition, not the individual plant, although it is 
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necessary for the roots, shoots and leaves to function. The case of L. maackii helps stress 
that entities that appear simple are in fact composites of many parts that function in 
different mechanisms.  
The composite nature of the organism L. maackii makes the mechanism of 
competition between this invasive plant and native species hierarchical. Its lower-level 
components are the mechanism of competition for light, the below-ground mechanism of 
competition for nutrients, the mechanism of allelopathy, and the mechanism of tolerance 
and resistance to herbivores. Each of these mechanisms is made up of parts at lower 
levels that are also investigated. The mechanism of competition for light consists of 
leaves and branches, with specific properties and performing activities. Shrubs that grow 
in understory have long shoots of a small diameter, fewer shoot ends, and a low canopy 
width. Since leaves are a key component of this mechanism, their properties are closely 
studied. Ecologists examine their higher stomatal density and thickness, their number per 
stem, area, mass, and their photosynthetic performance in low-light conditions compared 
to native species. The mechanism of photosynthesis that allows L. maackii to thrive in 
low-light conditions and the mechanism for longer leaf duration in L. maackii are a 
lower-level component of the mechanism of competition for light.  
Hierarchical organization of ecological mechanisms shows some entities can be 
components in several mechanisms. Leaves and roots, in addition to being parts of the 
mechanisms of above-ground and respectively below-ground competition, are also 
components in the mechanism of allelopathy. Leaves produce toxic compounds that, once 
they reach the ground with falling leaves, inhibit the germination of seeds of native 
species, while roots produce metabolites that inhibit the growth of roots of native species. 
The outcome is the same in both cases: native species are prevented from growing. 
Descriptions of the mechanism of allelopathy include chemical analyses of the 
allelochemicals that leaves and roots produce. 
Furthermore, ecological mechanisms do not have clear boundaries and what 
identifies them is the operational unification of components of different sizes. For 
example, the boundaries of the mechanism of competition for light are set by the 
operational unification of the parts of different sizes: shoots and leaves of individuals of 
species involved and light. 
Mechanisms in Ecology 9 
The explanatory role played by absent entities is another feature that, while not 
unique to ecological mechanisms, is very important. According to the Enemy Release 
Hypothesis, one of the hypotheses formulated to explain the success of L. maackii, the 
shrub spreads well in new environments because its traditional predators are absent. 
Similarly, it is not subject to intense competition, for there are no competitors that could 
challenge it. Ecologists consider the absent predators and competitors in light of the 
assumption that all species are parts of food webs and have predators and competitors 
that control their growth where the absence of either of them is a cause of a species’ 
growth. Had either a predator or competitor been present, the dynamics of the species 
would have been different. Ecologists treat absent predators and competitors as possible 
causes that could influence the phenomenon under scrutiny, and as such they are part of 
the mechanistic account of the phenomenon along with the detailed descriptions of actual 
entities. This is not a departure from the realism of mechanistic philosophy, since the 
absent predators and competitors are not abstractions or fictions, but real organisms that 
happen not to be present in the habitat under scrutiny. It indicates, however, that the 
counterfactual account of causation is necessary for thinking about causation in 
mechanisms. The list of absent causes could also include other instances of causation by 
absence involving abiotic or biotic factors. Absence of sunlight explains the absence of 
shade-intolerant plants, and absence of water explains the presence of drought-resistant 
plants and the absence of drought-intolerant ones. The absence of an entity is not 
sufficient by itself to account for the phenomenon. The other components of the 
mechanism are required. 
What Distinguishes Ecological Mechanisms. The central role of properties, the 
diminished role of organization and the relationship between the two, which I scrutinize 
next, are features that distinguish ecological mechanisms, yet neither the minimal account 
of mechanism nor the dominant conceptions of mechanism examine them closely or 
stress them enough.  
Given the ontic dualism of MDC’s conception, entities and activities take center 
stage in their characterization of mechanisms, and properties seem subordinated and only 
briefly acknowledged as bases of activities (Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). In 
Glennan’s latest work causal powers or capacities perform the metaphysical role that 
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properties have relative to activities in MDC’s characterization (Glennan 2014). The 
minimal account of mechanisms does not either thoroughly examine the role of properties 
in mechanisms. However, if the philosophy of mechanisms is to do justice to ecology, 
one has to emphasize the properties of entities. Ecologists are explicit about the 
importance of properties in characterization of mechanisms: 
Perhaps I should clarify what I mean by mechanism. The mechanistic basis for 
population ecology is provided by the properties of entities one hierarchical level 
lower than populations, that is, by the behavior and physiology of individual 
organisms (Turchin 1999, 156). 
And it is this focus on traits that defines ecology’s subdisciplines of functional ecology 
and physiological ecology (Shipley 2010). In ecological context, properties of entities are 
the actual traits of organs, individuals, populations and communities that ecologists 
measure, rather than the not-yet-manifested capacities. And focus on properties is 
necessary to better understand the activities of organisms. L. maackii chemically 
suppresses the growth of native plants. To understand this activity, ecologists performed 
an analysis at the molecular level of the chemicals and confirmed experimentally their 
inhibitory effect (Cipollini et al. 2008). In other instances, description of properties 
amounts to a description of causes of an organism’s impact, or of distribution and 
abundance. Variety of canopy shapes, i.e., leaf-forms, growth forms and heights of 
plants, accounts for better use of the three-dimensional space and, consequently, better 
light interception (Tremmel and Bazzaz 1993). Tolerance to high soil salinity and to 
deficiency of oxygen in water logged soils is a cause of the presence of the grass Juncus 
gerardi in those areas of marshes that are flooded regularly, while intolerance of the 
shrub Iva frutescens to those conditions explains its presence on the terrestrial borders of 
marshes that are not flooded (Bertness and Hacker 1994). 
“Organization is the least controversial element in any characterization of 
mechanisms,” yet how to understand organization is not a trivial matter and it has not 
been discussed extensively (Illari and Williamson 2012, 127). The consensus in the 
literature is that along with entities and activities, organization is a necessary condition 
for a mechanism to be able to produce the phenomenon for which it is responsible. As a 
condition different from entities and activities, organization is generally treated as 
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something that can be changed actually or in principle by a human or natural agent: 
should the same entities and activities be organized differently, they would produce a 
different phenomenon (Illari and Williamson 2012, 127). This view on organization is a 
version of what Glennan (2014) calls induced organization and that is different from 
affinitive organization. This distinction between induced and affinitive organization helps 
address the nature of organization in ecological mechanisms. 
In induced organization, the host, to use Glennan’s example, determines how 
guests are seated at a dinner party. Induced organization is thus imposed upon entities 
and/or activities by the agent, human or nature, determining the organization of the 
mechanism. Such changes to the organization of mechanisms can be found in 
biogeography. A human or natural agent can change the distance between an island and 
its source region or change the arrangement of islands in an archipelago. Nature 
accomplishes this by means of tectonic changes, while humans by modifying the 
landscape, as in the case of land-based islands. Changing the distance between islands 
and their source region modifies the number of species present on an island (Pâslaru 
2014). 
One could further analyze induced organization and add that it can be changed by 
either adding or removing components. That is, the host could invite additional guests, or 
disinvite some if they fail to behave properly. Humans induced the organization of 
entities─plant species─at the New York Botanical Garden when they introduced a new 
component: L. maackii. Likewise, humans induce the organization of ecological 
communities when they decide to remove L. maackii because it behaves as an invasive 
species and suppresses native plants.  
Affinitive organization depends upon affinities, or properties of entities and/or 
activities. The latter are organized as they are because of their properties. In induced 
organization, the host, to use Glennan’s example, determines how guests are seated at a 
dinner party. In affinitive organization, guests find their own seats based on their 
affinities─friends, family, football fans, etc (Glennan 2014). An illustration of this is the 
organization of the mechanism of dispersal of seeds of L. maackii. It involves the 
interaction between birds, deer, and small mammals with the shrub’s seeds and it was not 
induced, but resulted from affinities of the entities and their activities. Birds consume 
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seeds because of their nutritious value and taste, and spread them to other places, where 
they can germinate even after they had passed through the digestive tract of birds. No 
agent induced the interaction between birds, seeds and germination of the latter. Their 
properties determined them to interact and organization emerged as a result. The 
mechanism of competition for light appears organized: L. maackii leafs out before native 
plants and suppresses their growth by depriving them of light. Leafing at a certain time in 
the spring is a property of L. maackii that it will show regardless of where and in what 
plant community it is planted. Similarly, succession, another central ecological process, 
shows organization. An area is colonized in a certain order by species belonging to 
certain functional types. Properties of species determine the order of colonization. Soil-
fixing plants establish first, and then trees, herbivores and carnivores. Even if an 
herbivore were introduced first, it could not get established in the absence of plants 
suitable for consumption. These examples indicate that affinitive organization is 
restrictive. It restricts an entity’s interactions. They also indicate that properties of 
components limit induced organization and, more generally, “[a]ll mechanistic 
organization depends to some degree upon the existence of affinities─as parts must have 
the capacities to interact with other parts” (Glennan 2014). One cannot just organize 
differently the same entities and activities to get a different phenomenon. Trading the 
location of L. maackii’s canopy with that of its roots will produce no meaningful 
ecological phenomenon. The shrub will simply die. Whether induced organizations 
persist, also depends on the properties of entities. L. maackii was able to establish in New 
York, as well as throughout the Midwest, because of its properties and activities. Had it 
not been a good competitor for light, or a producer of allelochemicals, it would have been 
limited to the grounds of botanical gardens. 
As in the case of non-hierarchical organization, properties determine hierarchical 
organization. Toxic compounds produced by leaves and roots of L. maackii cannot be a 
component of the mechanism of competition for light and occupy the same level with 
leaves of native species, because the compounds do not have the geometrical and material 
properties necessary to diminish the amount of light reaching native plants. And roots 
cannot be part of this mechanism, since their properties are such that they can only 
subsist in the ground. Therefore, the hierarchical organization is a product of the 
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properties of entities and activities and one cannot induce a different hierarchical 
organization of a mechanism by reshuffling its components. Instead, one has to introduce 
different entities which, however, could destroy the mechanism. 
The stronger metaphysical finding of the foregoing examination is that inducive 
organization is on a par with properties in determining the functioning of mechanisms. 
Affinitive organization is a product of entities interacting in a certain manner in virtue of 
their properties. In mechanisms embodying affintive organization, their organization is an 
epiphenomenon. Organization is not the central element that determines how entities and 
activities produce phenomena, but the properties of entities and activities are. This 
implies that to change the organization of a mechanism, one has to change the entities 
and their activities. Only changing the spatial or temporal organization, while preserving 
the components unaltered is rarely possible.  
 
Experimental Methods for Mechanism Discovery. Experimental techniques in ecology 
exemplify a variety of experimental designs that have been identified by New Mechanists 
as strategies of mechanism discovery. Some experiments test the causal relevance of an 
entity, property, activity, or organizational characteristic. Others examine the activity or 
the entity that mediate between a cause and its effects, and are called by-what-activity 
and by-what-entity experiments, respectively (Craver and Darden 2013; see also Chapter 
19). Experiments examining multilevel mechanisms are bottom-up or top-down 
experiments, using the analytic or the synthetic strategies, respectively (Bechtel and 
Richardson 1993, 20). Alternatively, one intervenes on the start conditions to produce the 
explanandum phenomenon and examines the behavior of the putative components 
(Craver and Darden 2013, 128). Ecologists’ quest to identify mechanisms illustrates all of 
the foregoing experiments.  
Cipollini et al. (2008) did by-what-entity experiments when they identified the 
thirteen phenolic compounds contained in the leaves of L. maackii, and then singled out 
the four chemicals (including their formulas) that have an allelopathic effect. They did 
by-what-activity experiments when they determined how the identified chemicals impact 
the growth of other plants by inhibiting seed germination, and deter the foraging behavior 
of herbivorous insects. Additionally, one could identify in ecology by-what-property 
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experiments that detect the property of an entity or activity that is solely responsible for 
or is necessary for the production of a phenomenon. Such is the experiment of Luken and 
Mattimiro (1991) of clipping off repeatedly for four years all stems at the top of the base 
of forest- and open-grown L. maackii. The experiment determined the shrub has the 
property of being resilient under stress, i.e., it is able to resprout in different habitats.  
Ecologists also perform experiments to test for causal relevance. Luken et al. 
(1997) created large gaps in the shrub thicket to determine whether increasing light 
availability by removing the shrub enhances establishment of understory plants. This is 
an experiment that tests the causal relevance of shrub removal to enhancing abundance of 
understory plants. Similarly, Cipollini et al. (2008) tested the causal relevance of leaf 
metabolites in suppressing the growth of other plants. The experiment of Luken et al. 
(1997) illustrates bottom-up stimulation experiments. They exposed L. maackii and L. 
benzoin to increasing levels of light (0%, 25%, 100%) to simulate disturbance regimes 
that increase light availability. Typically, stimulation experiments examine putative 
components. However, light was not a putative component, but its level of causal 
efficacy, that Luken et al. examined, was. Bottom-up interference experiments in ecology 
decrease to various levels an abiotic or biotic component. An entire population of 
organisms could be removed, or parts of the organism, or the amount of an abiotic 
component could be decreased. For example, L. maackii was removed in some 
experiments to examine how its absence increases species richness (Gould and Gorchov 
2000), in others only half of a plants’ leaves were removed, and the strength of nitrogen 
fertilization was halved (Lieurance and Cipollini 2013).  
Top-down experiments also are common. Based on the hypothesis that leachate of 
L. maackii affects other species, Watling et al. (2011) created artificial pools in which 
tadpoles were exposed to water containing leachate and to non-contaminated water. This 
experimental strategy was also used to investigate the mechanistic relationship between 
various levels of species diversity and ecosystem processes. In light of hypotheses about 
the role of species diversity in ecosystem processes, Naeem et al. (1994) created various 
communities in laboratory conditions, while Tilman et al. (2006) assembled them in field 
experiments. Instead of examining the behavior of specific components as the system is 
activated, ecologists focused on how species diversity produces ecosystem processes and 
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compared them with ecosystem processes that are produced by an actual system of 
similarly varying species diversity.  
It is not always possible to manipulate components of a mechanism, or 
manipulation might not change the component in the same way as natural factors do. 
Additionally, manipulation might not be sufficient to assess the magnitude of the indirect 
effects correlated with the component from its direct ones. In such cases, some ecologists 
use path analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) to identify causal relationships 
making up mechanisms (Pâslaru 2015). Mitchell (1992, 1994) used these methods to 
identify the “underlying causal mechanisms” responsible for the reproductive success of 
flowering plants given plant traits and pollinator behavior. The first step in the use of 
SEM is to conjecture causal relationships among variables based on available knowledge 
about the phenomenon in question and to formulate a path model incorporating 
hypothesized causal relationships. The proposed model then tested for fit with available 
data. Should the model not fit the data, one can change some paths of the model in light 
of a new hypothesis about the underlying causal mechanism and re-test the model (Figure 
32.2). If deemed necessary, one could study the lower-level mechanisms that produce the 
causal relations between two variables. 
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Figure 32.2. Final causal model of the causal relationships between reproductive success 
of flowering plants given plant traits and pollinator behavior. From Mitchell (1994, 879). 
Reprinted by permission of The University of Chicago Press. 
 
IV. Mechanisms Above the Individual-Level 
Ecologists generally accept individual-level mechanisms, but some question the existence 
of mechanisms involving populations. A frequent objection states that explaining 
population dynamics in terms of abundances or density-dependence is a 
phenomenological approach, and, therefore, unsatisfactory (Tilman 1987, Turchin 1999). 
Mechanisms are found exclusively at the individual level; at the population level one 
finds only summaries of interactions among individuals, which are necessary, since it is 
not possible to follow the interactions among individual organisms (Turchin 1999). 
However, other ecologists affirm the existence of mechanisms at various levels beyond 
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individuals, as I show below. Given ecologists’ disagreement on this issue, further 
research is required.  
The case for mechanisms involving populations could be made based on 
Millstein’s (2006) argument for natural selection being a population-level causal process 
and her (2009) argument for populations as individuals. First, I offer some clarifications. 
Populations are groups of individuals of the same species. Since ecologists describe 
mechanisms that involve groups of organisms of different species, or of the same species, 
I prefer the term group-level mechanisms, instead of population-level, to cover both 
cases. Groups have properties that are different from those of individuals. The latter have 
properties that do not apply to groups: they have skeletons, physiological systems, 
organs, and engage in specific behaviors, e.g., feeding or mating. Groups are 
characterized by frequency, density, growth rate, generation, age structure, and diversity, 
properties that arise only when there is a collection of individuals. Group-level 
mechanisms contain causal relations that are best understood according to the 
counterfactual and manipulability accounts of causation. For example, ‘If one 
systematically manipulates the density of a population to change the annual fecundity, 
then variation in population density is the cause of variation in annual fecundity.’ Groups 
are the components in such mechanisms. They are organized spatially and temporally and 
changes in the properties of one component bring about changes in the properties of 
another component.  
An example of group-level mechanisms is what Palmer et al. (2000) call the 
hypothetical mechanism by which diverse terrestrial and aquatic plant communities may 
increase biodiversity in aquatic sediments (see Figure 32.3). Its components are not 
individual organisms, but groups of organisms of various species. For example, 
component microbial diversity groups together populations of microbes of different 
species. Its property diversity is the number of species to which microbes belong and the 
functional identity of those species. In addition to groups of organisms as components, 
this mechanism features as component a property: temporal stability of detrital pool. 
Components of the mechanism are linked causally in the sense of the manipulability 
perspective on causation. Changing the number of species, say, by decreasing them, or 
eliminating certain species of functional importance changes the number and functional 
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identity of species present in the sediment. And the presence of a component is 
responsible for the presence of another one, for e.g., diverse riparian assemblages are 
partly responsible for the presence of dissolved organic carbon resources. While 
components appear organized in how they are causally interrelated, they do not perform 
any activity. This example and ecologists’ use of the term mechanism suggest viewing 
group-level mechanisms as causal networks.  
 
 
Figure 32.3. Graph of a group-level mechanism. From Palmer et al (2000, 1069), 
Linkages between Aquatic Sediment Biota and Life Above Sediments as Potential 
Drivers of Biodiversity and Ecological Processes. BioScience 50 (12):1062-1075; 
published by Oxford University Press for The American Institute of Biological Sciences. 
Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. 
 
Description of this group-level mechanism is not sufficient to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon biodiversity in aquatic sediments, because 
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Palmer et al. require a description of the lower level mechanisms underlying the group-
level mechanism. Even if the group-level mechanism is explanatorily insufficient, it 
appears to be necessary to provide the context for individual-level mechanisms producing 
the upper-level causal relations.  
Increased population size mechanism was proposed to explain the macro-scale 
relationship between the amount of energy that an assemblage of species receives and the 
number of species it contains. Adding energy increases population size that in turn 
reduces its extinction risk, and since populations are of different species, this increases 
the number of species of the assemblage (Evans, Warren, and Gaston 2005). This seems 
to be a group-level mechanism in which components energy and populations are linked 
causally so as to produce the phenomenon the number of species in an assemblage. 
However, it can be viewed as a phenomenological description, the mechanism being at 
the individual level. Increased amounts of energy allow individual organisms to grow and 
reproduce, which amounts to increase in population size. Since there are organisms of 
different species, increasing the amount of energy increases population size of all species, 
which results in the community containing a greater number of species compared to the 
situation when less energy is available. This interpretation of increased population size 
mechanism indicates that at least some group-level mechanisms are reducible to 
individual-level mechanisms. Ecologists’ reason for speaking about mechanisms is 
methodological: “[i]t is neither profitable nor necessary … to try to explain all 
macroscopic phenomena in terms of the mechanisms at lower levels” (Brown 1995, 155). 
Elements of group-level mechanisms irreducible to individual-level mechanism 
appear in the mechanisms responsible for population regulation. This phenomenon occurs 
in populations fluctuating around a mean. Regulation happens when the per capita growth 
rate of the population is influenced by density-dependence. If the density of a population 
in an area is high, population growth is restricted, but it is amplified if the density is low 
(Rockwood 2015, 70-71). One of the proposed mechanisms to account for population 
regulation is crowding. In it, the frequency or intensity of interactions among individuals 
or with predators or parasites increases as population density increases, resulting in a 
lower fecundity for the population (Rodenhouse et al. 2003). As population density 
decreases, the frequency of interactions decreases, resulting in higher fecundity followed 
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by population increase. And so the population fluctuates around a mean. However, 
interactions among individuals, which constitute the individual-level mechanism of 
crowding, are insufficient to explain population regulation, because they occur at various 
densities. To account for population regulation, they have to be related to changes in 
population density, yet it is a property of a group-level component. This indicates that 
contrary to what ecologists claim, crowding is not a strictly individual-level mechanism 
but one that involves both individual- and group-level components.  
 
V. Conclusion 
Description of mechanisms is a central way of delivering explanations in ecology, 
especially at the individual-level, where they could be characterized as follows: 
An individual-level mechanism for a phenomenon in ecology consists of entities, 
biotic or abiotic, that perform specific activities and are organized in certain ways 
by virtue of their properties such that they are responsible for the phenomenon.  
These mechanisms show the importance of properties in determining activities and 
organization. The category of entities also comprises those entities that are absent, but 
could be present, and their absence coupled with existing entities is relevant for the 
functioning of the mechanism.  
While the nature of group-level mechanisms is less clear, and additional research 
is needed, it can be concluded based on ecologists’ use of the term mechanism that some 
of them are causal networks of group-level components and properties, while others offer 
useful methodological approaches despite being reducible to individual-level 
mechanisms.  
Since ecology studies phenomena on various levels of integration above 
individuals and groups, further research should address the nature of mechanisms 
ecologists describe at those levels and their relationship with mechanisms at other levels, 
and answer this question: are there mechanisms specific for each level, or are they just 
variations of the individual- and group-level mechanisms examined above? I conjecture 
the latter to be the case.  
 
Notes: 
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1I am thankful to Dragoș Popa-Miu for helping me improve figure 32.1 and to Marilyn 
Marx for refining the English expression of this text. Hanley Sustainability Institute at the 
University of Dayton supported financially part of the research for this project. 
2 Summary of the research is based on the review by McNeish and McEwan (in press). 
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